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Abstract
Background: Terms used to describe government-led resource withdrawal from ineffective and unsafe medical
services, including ‘rationing’ and ‘disinvestment’, have tended to be used interchangeably, despite having distinct
characteristics. This lack of descriptive precision for arguably distinct terms contributes to the obscurity that hinders
effective communication and the achievement of evidence-based decision-making. The objectives of this study are
to (1) identify the various terms used to describe resource withdrawal and (2) propose definitions for the key or
foundational terms, which includes a clear description of the unique characteristics of each.
Methods: This is a systematic qualitative synthesis of characteristics and terms found through a search of the academic
and grey literature. This approach involved identifying commonly used resource withdrawal terms, extracting data about
resource withdrawal characteristics associated with each term and conducting a comparative analysis by categorising
elements as antecedents, attributes or outcomes.
Results: Findings from an analysis of 106 documents demonstrated that terms used to describe resource withdrawal are
inconsistently defined and applied. The characteristics associated with these terms, mainly antecedents and attributes,
are used interchangeably by many authors but are differentiated by others. Our analysis resulted in the development of
a framework that organises these characteristics to demonstrate the unique attributes associated with each term. To
enhance precision, these terms were classified as either policy options or patient health outcomes and refined
definitions for rationing and disinvestment were developed. Rationing was defined as resource withdrawal that denies,
on average, patient health benefits. Disinvestment was defined as resource withdrawal that results in, on average,
improved or no change in health benefits.
Conclusion: Agreement on the definition of various resource withdrawal terms and their key characteristics is required
for transparent government decision-making regarding medical service withdrawal. This systematic qualitative synthesis
presents the proposed definitions of resource withdrawal terms that will promote consistency, benefit public policy
dialogue and enhance the policy-making process for health systems.
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Background
Many governments have expressed significant concern over
the rising costs of healthcare [1, 2]. Public spending on un-
safe, ineffective and inefficient medical services continues to
contribute to rising healthcare costs and minimises the ben-
efits realised by health systems [1]. Direct government inter-
vention through the modification of publicly funded health
insurance coverage is one potential avenue for limiting in-
appropriate care. Researchers and health professionals have
recommended mechanisms for discontinuing funding (or
facilitating resource withdrawal); however, the complexities
associated with these processes are not well understood,
particularly in light of the confusing and inconsistent ter-
minology associated with resource withdrawal [2–6]. Terms
used to describe government-led resource withdrawal from
ineffective and unsafe medical services, including ‘rationing’
and ‘disinvestment’, tend to be used interchangeably, despite
their distinct characteristics. This lack of descriptive preci-
sion for distinct terms contributes to a lack of clarity that
hinders effective communication and achieving evidence-
based decision-making. For this reason, clarification of
terminology is necessary to describe the situations in which
resource withdrawal occurs, to understand which factors in-
fluence resource withdrawal outcomes, and to communicate
resource withdrawal information accurately [7].
During a time of unparalleled health expenditure, there
exists a widespread belief that many health systems
achieve a poor return on investment. Empirical evidence,
primarily from high-income countries, indicates that only
20% of insured medical services have well-supported evi-
dence regarding treatment effectiveness [8], only 40% of
patients receive treatments with proven effectiveness, and
as much as 25% of patients receive treatments that are un-
necessary or harmful [9]. In low- and middle-income
countries, where there is little transparency or use of exist-
ing health outcome measures, up to 15% of overall deaths
(8.4 million) are attributed to poor quality care [10]. These
findings suggest that there are many instances of patients
receiving inappropriate care [11] and that resources are
going to waste. Medical care may be considered appropri-
ate if, on average, the probability of benefits of providing a
service sufficiently exceed the probability of harm [12].
As health technology assessment (HTA) becomes routi-
nised in many high-income countries, such as Canada, the
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Belgium,
Germany and Sweden (among others) [13], and in some
middle-income countries [14], researchers and healthcare
organisations have recommended that governments
embrace an explicit, evidence-based, routinised process
for resource withdrawal from inappropriate services [15].
Proponents of evidence-based medicine (EBM), cost-
effectiveness research (CER) and HTA have echoed these
recommendations [8, 16–19]. Broadly speaking, resource
withdrawal refers to the reduction, restriction or removal
of public entitlement to insured medical services (drugs,
devices, diagnostics and surgical procedures).
Through recent systematic reviews [19], geographical
service utilisation analyses [20], health technology reassess-
ment (HTR) [16] and other studies [21], several proposals
on the most effective way to identify inappropriate services
have been made. Despite calls for action, resource with-
drawal from inappropriate services using such an explicit,
evidence-based approach has not yet become routine
within most countries. A lack of these formal mechanisms
results in the continuation of funding for inappropriate ser-
vices that are (1) unsafe or harmful, (2) clinically ineffective,
(3) comparatively ineffective (4) and/or cost ineffective
[22–26].
Developing routine processes and mechanisms for re-
source withdrawal remains a challenge for governments for
several reasons, including the fact that a large proportion of
insured medical services are based on historical practices
and experiences rather than on their clinical efficacy and
cost effectiveness [8, 27]. There is also difficulty in distin-
guishing between different healthcare services to remedy an
ailment, categorising and organising particular healthcare
services for priority-setting, and assessing services in a way
that is both evidence based and socially fair [28].
A government’s reluctance towards developing a process
for withdrawing resources is often influenced by the polit-
ical implications associated with the explicit removal of
resources from health services. Contributing to the political
difficulty is the absence of well-defined resource with-
drawal terms, a void which leads to heightened levels of
confusion among medical professionals, policy-makers,
health organisations, politicians, patients/taxpayers and
other stakeholders [3–5, 18, 29]. Heightened confusion
may in turn lead to disagreement regarding various aspects
of government policies that target resource withdrawal,
which contributes to the resistance towards developing
explicit, routinised processes.
Objectives: clarifying concepts
Before advancing a common understanding of how gov-
ernments can design a regime for evidence-based resource
withdrawal, the definitions of important terminology must
be clarified. Unclear definitions make analysing the value
and implications of subject-specific terms difficult [30,
31]. When unclear definitions exist, further analysis is
needed to provide clarity and enhance communication
regarding the specific topic area, which in this case is
government-led resource withdrawal from medical
services. To this end, the objectives of the present study
were to (1) identify the various terms used to describe
resource withdrawal and (2) propose definitions for the
key or foundational terms, which includes a clear descrip-
tion of the unique characteristics (attributes, antecedents
and outcomes) of each.
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Methods
Procedure of systematic qualitative synthesis
This study conducted a systematic qualitative synthesis, de-
scribed by Saini and Shlonsky [32], to collect and analyse
the use of resource withdrawal characteristics and terms
within academic and grey literature. The synthesis consists
of 11 steps, the first of which was setting objectives (de-
scribed above). This approach to qualitative synthesis meth-
odology is intended to enhance understanding of how
different concepts connect and interact with one another.
Under this methodology, the lead researcher’s (ME) task
was to utilise secondary analysis of the existing literature as
data on the subject (resource withdrawal from medical ser-
vices) to investigate the relationships between terms and
define important terms using their characteristics, provided
that sufficient data exist. The result of the synthesis was the
researcher’s interpretation of the findings of the original eli-
gible studies [33]. In this way, the primary comparative data
for the present analysis was the description and interpret-
ation of the use of resource withdrawal terms’ characteris-
tics in the academic and grey literature.
To define the characteristics of each term we adopted
Rodger’s approach to concept analysis, which emphasises
the description and clarification of terms to further under-
stand their meaning and conduct research into the phenom-
ena/ideas they represent [7, 34]. The primary characteristic
concepts include the antecedents, attributes and outcomes.
Each were defined in the following manner [7]:
1) An antecedent was an event that was reported to
have logically preceded the resource withdrawal.
2) An attribute was an inherent quality or feature of
the resource withdrawal process.
3) An outcome was an occurrence that results from
resource withdrawal at the level of services (e.g.
reduced, restricted or denied), patients (e.g.
improved, maintained or reduced health outcome)
or the health system (e.g. efficiency, spending).
Analysis oriented around these characteristics, similar to
a concept analysis approach, is often used in nursing
research [35–37]. Patterns of characteristics’ use that
emerged in the analysis were used to help synthesise char-
acteristics and meanings of specific terms were identified
as important through an iterative analysis of the literature.
Eligibility/scope of research
The second step was to establish the breadth of the re-
search. Given that the review focused on government-led
resource withdrawal from medical services, we included
articles that used resource withdrawal terms related to
government regulation of resources used for medical ser-
vices. Articles and policy documents were included if they
(1) described/interpreted a resource withdrawal activity
(e.g. delisting, rationing, disinvesting, decommissioning)
that was related to medical service(s) (drugs, devices, diag-
nostics and surgical procedures); (2) described/interpreted
the role of government (national/subnational/local) in the
process of resource withdrawal; (3) focused on one or more
of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries; and (4) was published in English.
OECD countries were chosen in order to focus on coun-
tries with health systems in which government have a well-
developed role in regulating and funding medical services.
Information sources
Step three included undertaking searches and informa-
tion retrieval. Academic electronic databases provided
the platform for searching scholarly papers. The grey lit-
erature included government policy reports and non-
governmental organisation reports. The grey literature
was obtained through websites that were originally iden-
tified using the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Tech-
nology in Health advice for searching health-related grey
literature [13]. Specific articles were also identified
through reference chaining and the provision of alerts
from electronic databases advising that newly published
articles matched search criteria.
Relevant studies were identified through a search of the
following eight electronic databases and platforms: CINA
HL, Embase, HealthSTAR, Medline, ProQuest, PsycINFO,
Scholar Portal and Web of Science. The search was con-
ducted in November 2014. Keywords related to resource
withdrawal (“disinvest” OR “divest” OR “decommission”
OR “delist” OR “ration” OR “deinsure” OR “displace” OR
“replace” OR “retract” OR “restrict”) and health service
type (“health service” OR “healthcare service” OR “medical
service” OR “drug therapy” OR “diagnostic service” OR
“laboratory service” OR “technology”) were used. Trunca-
tions of terms were searched separately within each data-
base in order to capture all possible iterations of keywords
in the literature. The search identified articles that had the
listed terms in the title, abstract or keywords. The same
set of terms was used to search the grey literature.
Data screening extraction
Step four included screening each article’s title and ab-
stract for eligibility. As articles were screened by the pri-
mary researcher (ME) and an independent research
assistant, eligible articles were classified by study type (step
5). After title and abstract screening, each eligible article’s
full text was reviewed to further determine if the paper
was eligible (step 6). During full text review, the primary
researcher (ME) extracted the following data from all eli-
gible articles: definition, antecedents, attributes, outcomes
on service, patient, health system, and medical service type.
Characteristics of the studies were also extracted, includ-
ing study country, objective, policy strategies, findings,
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methods and implications (step 7). If a term’s definition
was explicitly stated, it was copied to the data extraction
table. If the articles did not explicitly provide term defin-
ition but implied it, the primary investigator developed a
definition based on the original study’s implications.
Step eight (quality assessment) was not conducted in
this study because a significant majority of the studies
were commentaries, essays or opinion pieces with no
methods or results to assess. Furthermore, because the
objective was to extract definitions of terms and not to
report the results of the study, quality assessment was
not deemed necessary. After the primary investigator
reviewed an initial set of articles at the full text stage,
both the primary investigator and a second researcher
extracted data from these articles. Results from each re-
searcher’s data extractions were compared for all arti-
cles. There were no significant discrepancies to report
between the data extractions.
Data synthesis
Data comparison and synthesis were conducted itera-
tively throughout the analytic process by the primary in-
vestigator (ME) (step 9). Throughout the extraction of
relevant data, information was consistently and thor-
oughly reviewed and analysed to produce preliminary
descriptions of patterns found in the studies. The pri-
mary investigator explored relationships both within and
among the antecedents, attributes and outcomes as de-
scribed in the literature. The primary investigator identi-
fied and extracted the ways in which characteristics were
associated with prominent terms. Characteristics were
then integrated into a synthesis table, where overlap and
differences could be more readily identified and de-
scribed. Review and analysis of the terms and how their
characteristics were described, was conducted in order
to synthesise categories for resource withdrawal terms
with definitions of prominent terms (step 10). Due to
the nature of the review, namely analysing researcher
and policy-maker use of resource withdrawal terms (as
opposed to results of their analysis), the quality appraisal
of studies was deemed unnecessary. Step 11 was the dis-
semination of the results.
Results
Figure 1 illustrates the steps for the literature search and
screening of both academic and grey literature databases.
The academic literature search uncovered 4407 articles
across all databases. Each database was reviewed sequen-
tially, which meant duplicates were not removed until the
full-text review stage. Title and abstract screening resulted
in 146 eligible articles. At this stage, all eligible articles
were combined and 13 duplicates were found and re-
moved, leaving 133 articles for full-text review. Of these,
33 articles met eligibility criteria. Reference checking was
used to identify another 36 eligible articles. Periodic up-
dates of newly released articles that met search criteria
from the electronic databases resulted in 11 additional eli-
gible articles. As a result, 80 academic articles were in-
cluded. The Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technology
in Health tool for searching grey literature resulted in 385
articles, of which 26 were eligible for inclusion. In total,
106 articles met the eligibility criteria and were included
in the analysis.
Additional file 1: Appendix 1 details how authors have
used the same characteristics to refer to different re-
source withdrawal terms. From these results, it is evident
that there has been extensive overlap of, confusion sur-
rounding and contradiction between two prominent
terms – (1) rationing and (2) disinvestment. The
remaining terms identified in Additional file 1: Appendix
1 and Additional file 2: Appendix 3 have been cate-
gorised as policy options and are discussed below.
Resource withdrawal characteristics
Findings from the present study help categorise various
resource withdrawal characteristics into antecedents, at-
tributes and outcomes. Figure 2 depicts all the promin-
ent descriptions of resource withdrawal found in the
literature and organises them into their associated char-
acteristics. Within each column, the prominent descrip-
tion of each resource withdrawal characteristic is
identified. The process began with antecedents that have
been identified to logically precede resource withdrawal,
which was followed by the various processes that gov-
ernments have used to identify medical services and the
policy options to withdraw resources. Finally, there were
the outcomes of withdrawal, which we have categorised
as either patient or health system outcomes. The main
components of each characteristic that were identified in
the table are described in each section below.
Antecedents to resource withdrawal
Antecedents, often referred to as ‘triggers for resource
withdrawal’, are events that proceed and logically lead to
resource withdrawal. Additional file 1: Appendix 1 in-
cludes all antecedents found in the search. It is important
to note that the articles described many of the antecedents
as potential precursors but lacked analysis aimed at unco-
vering the underlying reasons for resource withdrawal.
Antecedents were characterised into one of three categor-
ies – (1) emergence of new research evidence; (2) intro-
duction of a new technology; or (3) budget restrictions.
Emergence of new research evidence Articles described
research evidence as a theoretical trigger for resource
withdrawal but there was not a clear example of re-
source withdrawal being initiated by the emergence of
new evidence. The following evidence-based antecedents
Embrett et al. Health Research Policy and Systems          (2020) 18:123 Page 4 of 13
have the potential to precede resource withdrawal: discov-
ery that a service is unsafe or harmful; discovery that a ser-
vice is ineffective; discovery that a service is effective but
has poor cost-effectiveness; discovery that a service is
comparatively ineffective; or discovery that there is evi-
dence of regional variation in the use of a medical service
[18, 26, 29, 38–41]. The observed lack of examples dem-
onstrating resource withdrawal that resulted from the
emergence of evidence may be attributed the ‘black box’
that encompasses much of public policy decision-making
surrounding government-led resource withdrawal [42, 43].
This possibility speaks to the difficulty of evidence-based
decision-making in resource withdrawal and the ambigu-
ity found in evidence for clinical effectiveness [44]. Al-
though this search failed to identify an explicit example of
emerging evidence immediately preceding a process that
led to government-led resource withdrawal, emerging re-
search evidence was assumed by many to be the standard
gateway to an explicit identification, assessment and im-
plementation of resource withdrawal.
Introduction of a new technology New technologies
that were adopted into benefits packages for publicly in-
sured services, whether more cost-effective or not, were
viewed as an important prompt to replace existing tech-
nologies. Recent evidence from Prasad [45, 46] indicated
that a large proportion of new technologies replace exist-
ing ones, despite the lack of clinical evidence that the novel
technologies are superior. Prasad identified over 140 med-
ical services that have been superseded by new technolo-
gies despite evidence that the previous service was more
clinically effective. Adopting a new technology with a lack
of supportive evidence illustrates the pressure that health
systems are often under to adopt the ‘latest and greatest’
technologies and services. Perhaps most importantly, the
introduction of new technology may lead to an implicit
Fig. 1 Systematic review process
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disinvestment from existing services, also referred to as
obsolescence, rather than explicit policy-led resource
withdrawal.
Budget restrictions Budgetary events were the most
cited trigger for resource withdrawal. This category in-
cluded financial considerations that influence withdrawal,
including a reduction in the overall healthcare budget,
overspending and spending audits. Many researchers
viewed cost savings as a likely goal of resource withdrawal
[3, 17, 42] and some measured potential cost savings [25].
None, however, reported measured cost savings within the
health system. Many of the services targeted for resource
withdrawal for budgetary reasons were services for which
medical necessity was contested, for example, cosmetic
breast surgery [47] and in vitro fertilisation [19, 48, 49].
Importantly, cost was rarely the sole reason for service re-
moval. Instead, cost-effectiveness was often used as a
measure to help support withdrawal decisions.
Attributes for identifying services for resource withdrawal
Attributes of resource withdrawal relate to the process of
implicitly or explicitly identifying and assessing services for
withdrawal. The process has several phases, none of which
are clearly detailed in the execution of government-led re-
source withdrawal. Despite the lack of detailed examples,
recommendations for optimising evidence-based ap-
proaches are made throughout the literature. Approaches
that have been recommended for identifying services well-
suited for resource withdrawal include assessments of clin-
ical effectiveness from EBM, CER, value assessment
(HTA/HTR) and stakeholder consultation [5, 23, 25, 47,
50]. Henshall [51] reports that experts from the Health
Technology Assessment International policy forum
recommended that services be prioritised using robust evi-
dence regarding their impact on patient health. Other
scholars recommend engaging in resource withdrawal
from services that have ‘low-value’ in the healthcare
system. The latter measure may be problematic since the
threshold for what constitutes as ‘low-value’ may differ
between health systems [21]. Involving stakeholders
throughout the withdrawal process, especially members of
the public and healthcare service providers, was viewed as
an essential factor in determining the success of a given
resource withdrawal [3, 6, 17, 52, 53].
Processes are either explicit or implicit. Although re-
search described governments recommending explicit re-
source withdrawal processes, most government resource
withdrawal was actually implicit. Explicit processes of
resource withdrawal include decisions made concerning
the amount and forms of resources that are available, the
recipients of resources, and the conditions under which re-
sources will be received [54–56]. In the reviewed literature,
explicit resource withdrawal was expected to involve sig-
nificant political resistance because of its traceability [54,
57]. Implicit decision-making, on the other hand, typically
occurs at the micro or meso level, without involving direct
government decisions regarding resource withdrawal from
Fig. 2 Characteristics of government-led resource withdrawal from medical services
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a specific service [54]. Instead, governments will often en-
act policies that encourage implicit, indirect withdrawal at
an organisational or provider level, and these processes are
frequently driven by changes in medical practice or reduc-
tions in the budget over time [50].
Attributes of policy options for resource withdrawal
Many of the resource withdrawal terms used in the lit-
erature were associated with policy options for with-
drawal. In some cases, terms such as decommissioning,
delisting and de-insuring were used interchangeably with
each other [26, 29, 58]. The policy option chosen will
directly affect the overall impact of resource withdrawal
on the system and patients, but the policy options do
not represent the final consequence of the resource
withdrawal. To clarify the use of the terms, we classify
policy options into the following categories: (1) defining
insured services, (2) incentives and (3) information.
Firstly, policy options may involve the complete or
partial withdrawal of resources, which can be considered
absolute and relative withdrawal, respectively [16, 17, 22,
47, 59]. Full withdrawal refers to the complete removal
of governmental resources from a service, thereby elim-
inating the service’s availability through public provision
or insurance. Partial withdrawal involves a reduction in
resources provided to a service, thus reducing the acces-
sibility of the service through public provision or insur-
ance. Whether a given instance of resource withdrawal
is categorised as full or partial depends largely on the
policy option selected for implementation.
Defining insured services (explicit/partial or full
withdrawal) In the literature analysed, the most frequently
referenced policy option was ‘defining health services’.
Defining insured services is a direct, explicit method of re-
source withdrawal because it alters the manner through
which public funds are provided for a service. Many of the
terms used in the literature search were associated with de-
fining insured services. These included the terms delisting,
decommissioning, de-insuring and restricting. Defining
insured services may include removal of services from the
public benefits; replacement of the service with an alterna-
tive; reduction of the amount of service allowed to be pro-
vided; restricting provision or remuneration for a service to
a specific patient or disease characteristic(s); and restricting
provision or remuneration of a service to a specific type of
healthcare providers and healthcare settings.
Incentives Two categories of policy option incentives
were identified in relation to resource withdrawal – (1)
incentivising patients and (2) incentivising providers. Both
types of incentivising are implicit, partial withdraw ap-
proaches because the choice of providing or using services
remains in the hands of the provider or patient. Patients
may be incentivised to avoid accessing services through
user charges, co-payments or wait listing. Many countries
have already instituted increased user charges for pharma-
ceuticals, primary care, specialist care, emergency care,
inpatient care and long-term care. Despite these changes,
the extent to which these disincentives are applied to ‘low-
value’ or inappropriate services is unclear [60]. Provider
behaviour may be incentivised through altering remuner-
ation levers, especially through the modification of billing
amounts for specific services [41]. ‘Gating’ is another way
to disincentivise providers by increasing the administrative
difficulty associated with providing a given service. One ex-
ample of gating was described as the removal of two lab test
check boxes for a vitamin B12 and serum ferritin tests,
from a laboratory order form such that providers had to
manually request the test (instead of just checking the
box) [61].
Information (for policy-makers, providers and the
public) The provision of information to certain stake-
holders has the potential to dissuade them from using tar-
geted medical services. Forms of information provision
aimed at implicitly withdrawing resources include the
following:
 The provision of guidelines for providers to follow
while delivering care. Violating specific guidelines,
whether mandatory or recommended, may result in
serious repercussions beyond the denial of
reimbursement. Guidelines are not generally
mandatory but provide a critical informational
source for best practice [41, 47, 55, 60].
 The education of the public and providers about
inappropriate and ‘low-value’ care effectiveness in order
to reduce service reliance is not addressed in the
articles analysed, although others have reported its
futility [62]. Providing information on best practices
and formal training, on the other hand, has resulted in
an increased reliance on higher quality care [60]; and
 The monitoring of medical service use, including
HTR, in order to evaluate the existing services further
and provide additional information on best practice.
Resource withdrawal outcomes: impact on system and
patient
Impact on the healthcare system
The impact that resource withdraw ultimately has on a
given healthcare system will depend on where, if any-
where, the withdrawn resources are reallocated to. There
is limited evidence that deliberate reallocation of with-
drawn resources occurs [4, 29, 41, 58]. One process that
aims to reinvest resources through a systematic process
is programme budgeting and marginal analysis [17, 43,
63]; however, results are mixed [63]. The reallocation of
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withdrawn resources was primarily associated with the
term disinvestment. Although resource withdrawal may
actually benefit the system by reallocating resources to
more efficient services, the more likely scenario is that
the withdrawal ‘frees up’ resources for use elsewhere but
fails to predetermine where those resources will go [16].
In this scenario, it is impossible to determine if the re-
sources will be used for more cost-effective services or if
they end up being reallocated at all. It will be important
for future research to examine whether resource with-
drawal from inappropriate services achieves some form
of improvement in health system performance.
Impact on the patient
The impact of resource withdrawal on the patient may be
the most critical outcome. Patient health can, in essence,
be conceptualised as the ‘ultimate dependent variable’,
since improving the health of patients is the overall goal of
the healthcare system [64, 65]. The impact that resource
withdrawal has on patients’ health depends largely on the
clinical effectiveness of the specific service and on the
presence, or lack thereof, of a suitable alternative service.
There are three potential outcomes of providing a service
to a patient – (1) no change in patient health, (2) improve-
ment in patient health or (3) deterioration in patient
health. Resource withdrawal from a service that is
inappropriate or expected to do more harm than good will
ultimately benefit a given patient’s expected health out-
comes. Resource withdrawal from a service that is appro-
priate or expected to do more good than harm will
withhold potentially beneficial care from the patient, thus
worsening their health. Exceptions exist when a medically
optimal alternative service is made available.
Resource withdrawal terms
Terms that had enough description and application to syn-
thesise are included in Additional file 1: Appendix 2, along
with their associated definition, attributes, antecedents, out-
comes and health service type (when identified). Information
in this appendix demonstrates the plethora of definitions
used for several resource withdrawal terms. Twenty-three
different definitions were found for disinvestment, 21 for ra-
tioning, 4 for decommissioning, 4 for delisting, 3 for HTR, 1
for de-insuring and 1 for de-implementation.
As Table 1 demonstrates, the terms rationing and dis-
investment have had overlapping definitions used to de-
scribe them, with certain characteristics included in
some definitions and excluded from others. Some re-
searchers, for example, have described disinvestment as
a form of rationing. Elshaug et al. [9] states, “for the clin-
ician there is often concern that disinvestment represents
a blunt instrument of rationing”. Decision-makers in-
volved in determining healthcare funding arrangements
have also used the terms interchangeably [73].
Several of the terms identified have been organised
into the characteristics of resource withdrawal. De-
listing, decommissioning, de-insuring and de-
implementation have been organised as attributes of
government policy options that redefine public health
insurance packages, as displayed in Fig. 2. HTR is orga-
nised as an attribute in the process for identifying exist-
ing medical services.
Defining prevalent resource withdrawal terms
The final objective of the present study is to refine defini-
tions of prevalent, commonly used resource withdrawal
terms. As Additional file 1: Appendix 2 illustrates, ration-
ing and disinvestment are two foundational terms that
represent the outcomes of resource withdrawal as op-
posed to interventions for identifying services (e.g. HTR)
and policy options (e.g. de-listing). Table 1 provides exam-
ples of the prominent definitions of the two terms and il-
lustrates the extensive overlap between their uses. Our
approach to refine the definitions of these foundational
terms was to synthesise their most common characteris-
tics to form the basis for their respective definitions.
As described in the majority of the literature, rationing
has the underlying presumption of scarce resources; there-
fore, rationing involves the prioritisation of resources
resulting in some services being excluded from public
funding, thereby denying people potentially beneficial ser-
vices. In other words, if there were unlimited resources,
there would be no need to ration. In comparison, dis-
investment has arisen as an approach to reducing ineffect-
ive, harmful or ‘low-value’ medical services to improve the
health of patients. Definitions ought to focus on these
defining characteristics of rationing and disinvestment
and namely on the impact on patient health. In order to
determine the impact on patient health, the clinical effect-
iveness definition of appropriate care has been employed.
This definition defines a service as appropriate if the bene-
fits of providing a service sufficiently exceed the risks asso-
ciated with the treatment [12]. Given this, the following
definitions are suggested:
 Disinvestment: the full or partial withdrawal of
resources from a medical service that it is clinically
expected, on average, to result in a patient achieving
health benefits or no change in health benefit.
 Rationing: the full or partial withdrawal of resources
from a medical service that is clinically expected, on
average, to result in a patient achieving diminished
health benefits.
There are various methods to measure either condition-
specific or patient-specific health outcomes and it is be-
yond the objectives of this study to propose an ideal meas-
ure. Hundreds of specific tools have been developed to
Embrett et al. Health Research Policy and Systems          (2020) 18:123 Page 8 of 13
measure health outcomes such as disease progression, pa-
tient survival time, patient satisfaction and quality of life.
Using these definitions, if resource withdrawal worsens
any of these health outcomes, it is an example of rationing
healthcare. If resource withdrawal does not worsen an out-
come, then it can accurately be defined as disinvestment.
Mapping whether or not resource withdrawal from a spe-
cific medical service affects all of these categories requires
the application of a complex model that may not be fully
established yet. Despite this, existing measurements of par-
ticular health outcomes for medical services will have to
be sufficient until new ones become available.
Discussion
This study addressed the confusion between the use of
various terms describing government-led resource with-
drawal and the characteristics associated with those terms
found in the academic and grey literature. In addition to
Fig. 2, which encapsulates prominent descriptive character-
istics of resource withdrawal, we have provided clarifying
definitions of two of the most prominent and confused re-
source withdrawal terms – disinvestment and rationing. A
key finding of our results is that characteristics of resource
withdrawal have been associated with various terms in
such a manner that none of the terms hold a consistent
meaning for any of the characteristics. Although this find-
ing is concerning, it is not unusual for terms and their as-
sociated characteristics to change over time or between
different contexts [74]. Changes may serve as a way to map
shifts in research trends that occurred when disinvestment
emerged as a resource withdrawal term in healthcare.
Much of the inconsistent use of resource withdrawal
terms has resulted from the differences between the trad-
itional understanding of rationing and the emergent charac-
teristics of disinvestment. Until approximately 2006, nearly
all resource withdrawal activities described in the literature
were considered a form of rationing. Disinvestment became
increasingly popular in 2004, after the National Institute of
Clinical Evidence (NICE) identified it as a priority activity
for reducing spending and improving healthcare efficiency
through the provision of appropriate care [64]. Some
scholars attribute this term’s rise in popularity to the prom-
inence of HTA [4, 19, 29]. As illustrated by the results of
the present study, the use of disinvestment has been far
from consistent and it is evident that the term borrowed
some of the characteristics previously assigned to rationing,
including some researchers defining it as an evidence-based
process and a cost-cutting procedure [20].
A second key finding is that much of the existing litera-
ture primarily defines resource withdrawal terms, specific-
ally rationing and disinvestment, based on either its
antecedents or its attributes (see Additional file 1: Appen-
dices 1 and 2). Government-led resource withdrawal is a
public policy decision [75–78]; therefore, we argue that
using these two characteristics as part of the definition will
lead to more confusion because public policies have many
contextual factors, beyond research evidence, which influ-
ence political decision-making [79, 80]. Clinical and eco-
nomic evidence is rarely enough to put issues onto a
governmental agenda. Instead, a myriad of factors affect
the likelihood that certain public policy decisions will be
prioritised [81]. The stated reasons for any government de-
cision may not reflect the true policy objectives but instead
represent a strategic use of language. As a result, there
may be many underlying ‘true’ but unstated motivations.
For example, a specific instance of resource withdrawal
may be the result of a disagreement between various stake-
holders on costs and benefits [82, 83]. This may be exacer-
bated by the perception that withdrawing resources from
medical services is a risky political decision [29, 41, 55].
Table 1 Example of the overlap between the definitions of disinvestment and rationing
Description of definition Disinvestment Rationing
A process of selecting and reducing/
removing select medical services
The formal processes and mechanisms that are
used to reduce or discontinue the use of selected
procedures and treatments [4]
Explicit decisions about the amounts and types of
resources to be made available, eligible populations,
and specific rules for allocation [54]
A process of selecting and reducing/
removing only harmful/inefficient or
ineffective medical services
The cessation or restriction of potentially harmful,
clinically ineffective or cost inefficient practices [23]
Taking resources from services that provide little or
no value [66]
The elimination or reduction in the provision of a
service based on evidence of low value [67]
Limiting the choice of services to provide in an area
with scarce resources; choice is decided on
effectiveness, equity and patient choice [68]
A process of withdrawing resources
and reallocating them to medical
services of higher value
The processes of (partially or completely) withdrawing
health resources from any existing healthcare
practices, procedures, technologies or pharmaceuticals
that are deemed to deliver little or no health gain for
their cost and are thus not efficient health resource
allocations; within this is the view to reallocation or
reinvestment towards technologies, practices and
programmes with greater demonstrated
(cost-)effectiveness [9, 21, 29, 41, 52, 69, 70];
A priority-setting activity where resources are
removed from the service such that other more
effective ones are prioritised [71]
Restriction of medical services
to only those who benefit
Funding decision to restrict the use of a service
to those who may benefit the most [47]
Restriction of services to those who have a higher
perceived benefit [72]
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Furthermore, the use of process characteristics within
the definition of a resource withdrawal term may also lead
to continued confusion, especially since the process occurs
at a public policy level. As our findings suggest, processes
for assessing and recommending services for resource
withdrawal are rarely straightforward [20] and many re-
source withdrawal decisions are politically or socially moti-
vated. Influences, which can range from stakeholder input
to interest group advocacy, become increasingly important
in public policy decisions compared to clinical decision-
making [80]. Protocols and guidelines for decision-making
fail to invariably predict outcomes and often omit import-
ant contextual influences on the outcome [84]. Countries
also have different institutional structures that have a high
level of influence on which decisions end up on the gov-
ernment’s agenda and how these decisions are eventually
formulated [85, 86]. For these reasons, the same with-
drawal decision may indeed be made through a different
process. If different processes can be used for a single
definition, then the term no longer has clear boundaries
and will likely not be consistently applied.
Strengths and limitations
The primary strength of this study is the breadth of grey
and academic literature that was analysed, which provided
a plethora of documents from a variety of disciplines, coun-
tries and sources. The literature analysed included qualita-
tive and quantitative studies, essays, editorials and literature
from HTA, priority-setting economics and other social
science disciplines. Many of the reviews that were included
in the present study focused on resource withdrawal from
inappropriate or low-value services [4, 41, 87], which ex-
cluded some government-led resource withdrawal from
services that may be beneficial but not a high enough prior-
ity to be included in a public benefits package [47, 88]. The
present study included all types of government-led resource
withdrawal, which provided additional literature to analyse.
This study is limited to government-led resource with-
drawal associated with medical services specifically and ex-
cludes withdrawal related to system reforms, organisational
withdrawal and clinical decisions regarding withdrawal.
Many reforms that include the redistribution of resources
were not included in this study, including home care re-
form and mental health reform. Therefore, caution should
be exercised if results are interpreted in other resource
withdrawal contexts (i.e. beyond government-funded med-
ical services). There is also a language bias, as only English
studies are included. Furthermore, only OECD countries
were included in the analysis and therefore implications
may not apply to low-income countries. We were not inter-
ested in the results of each study included in the review; in-
stead, we were interested in their use of terms and
characteristics and therefore the objectives of the study did
not require the collection and reporting of AMSTAR [89]
items, including listing all studies that were not eligible,
assessing the quality of evidence and combining findings
from studies. Furthermore, the results are based on a lim-
ited range of resource withdrawal decisions and should not
necessarily be applied to resource withdrawal implementa-
tion without further study. Policy decisions should not be
automatically considered as implemented, as several other
factors are known to influence implementation, which this
study did not explore.
Implications for research
The major implication of our findings is the suggestion to
researchers to define resource withdrawal using the
impact that a given service has on patient health. This will
help set a standard for resource withdrawal terms and fo-
cuses on ‘value’ for the patient. The definitions presented
here do not require measurement of the expected health
benefit gained or denied, which would mandate a choice
of measurement to determine a threshold (e.g. quality-
adjusted life years). Instead, these revised definitions re-
quire evidence that the withdrawn service was expected to
provide some benefit or not (through EBM) or to provide
the most benefit from a set of alternatives as determined
by CER. Two general scenarios exist – (1) the service pro-
vides benefit but is withdrawn (rationing) or (2) the ser-
vice provides no benefit, may do harm, or is inferior to an
alternative service option and is withdrawn (disinvesting).
Conclusion
Following the rise of EBM, and subsequently HTA,
government-led explicit resource withdrawal from medical
services has attracted substantial attention. Resource with-
drawal from inappropriate services may have a significant
impact on the improvement of value in resource spending
within healthcare systems. It is likely, however, that re-
source withdrawal will not achieve its full potential until
its characteristics and prominent terms are used accurately
and reliably. We present a clarifying framework (Fig. 2)
that identifies the main characteristics of resource with-
drawal and organises them. Furthermore, the established
definitions presented here provide a step in the direction
of clarifying resource withdrawal terms that are used in
the academic terminology used to study policy-making.
Although primarily intended as a theoretical contribution,
results have some potential to promote accountability by
governments, organisations and individuals responsible for
resource withdrawal decisions at each level by emphasising
the ultimate goal of the health system, that is, providing
health benefit to patients. It is known that health systems
are historically resistant to system-level reform [90]. By fo-
cusing the discussion on potential health benefits, this ana-
lysis may help shift focus away from basing public policy
decisions on cost and towards improving patient health.
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